Colonial Modernity and Tourism in East Asia by Kim, Bok-rae
© Kim, et al. All Rights Reserved 16 www.hssr.in
ISSN : 2395-6518 (Online) Vol. 3 (1) (Feb 2015) Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews (HSSR)
Introduction
Tourism is a free spatial movement across boundaries. The 
use of modern transportation such as railway, airplane, and 
automobile creates a new paradigm of consumer culture in 
tourism. The symbol of modernity is not a pedestrian, but train 
or airline passengers and motorists, etc. in so far as modernity 
privileges “sight” over other senses. Tourism means an exodus 
from monotonous everyday life or a romantic excursion for 
freedom. Nonetheless, modern tourism is not necessarily free 
and the logic of power heavily weighs on the space of tourism. 
This negative side of modern tourism comes under the category 
of Logos-modernity.
The aim of this paper is to examine the correlation between 
colonial modernity and tourism in East Asia through the 
examples of China, Korea, and Japan. In the process of the 
World system of capitalism in East Asia, most Asian countries 
underwent “(universal) colonial experience,” except Japan and 
Thailand. Japan was a unique non-European country which 
succeeded in creating an “(abnormal) modern nation-state” able 
to compete with Europe. Japan intended to establish a new East 
Asian system which might replace the old Sino-centric system 
in the name of “Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,” but failed.
From a historical point of view, the development of tourism 
as an integral part of a developmental strategy was directly 
proportional to that of modernity or modernization. As Tim 
Oakes pointed out, tourism plays an important role in building 
Asia’s alternative path toward modernity. We will discuss East-
Asian modern tourism in relation to colonial modernity through 
the eyes of a tourist (host/guest interaction), through travel notes, 
colonial novels or visual media (movie), and ﬁ nally national 
identity (Chineseness, Japaneseness, and Korean us-ness).
Mainland Chinese tourists in Hong Kong
The ﬁ rst case study is an analysis of the cultural, if not colonial, 
experience of modern Chinese tourists during their travel to 
Hong Kong in the ﬁ rst half of the 20th century. As a result of 
the Treaty of Nanjing (ﬁ rst of the unequal treaties), signed to 
effect the end of the ﬁ rst Opium war on the August 29th, 1842, 
Hong Kong was ceded to the UK as a crown colony. Thus, the 
mainland Chinese seemed to have two kinds of image, viz. 
to Hong Kong. The ﬁ rst image of Hong Kong is a symbol of 
“national disgrace.” Most Chinese considered it as a “colony” 
they lost as a result of their defeat. For that reason, Hong Kong 
had played a role of awakening for them the appropriateness for 
national prosperity and military strength.
The second image is as a symbol of “modernity” which existed 
very close to China. Mainland intellectuals who visited Hong 
Kong felt the need to directly experience beautiful buildings, 
clean streets, and the strict maintenance of public order built by the 
Westerners, and to positively accept Western civilization. Many 
Chinese modern reformers and revolutionaries encountered an 
exemplary model for Western civilization through Hong Kong.
From a historical point of view, many of China’s mainland 
scholars have considered the history of Hong Kong over the past 
150 years as a colonial one, but new historical research based on 
Hong Kong people’s sense of reality is on the rise. Two research 
projects have been carried out on how Hong Kong was seen in 
the Japanese tourist gaze, but there has only been one research on 
Hong Kong seen by mainland Chinese tourists (Lo, 1983). For 
the mainland Chinese, Hong Kong was not only the “other,” but 
also a boundary that ﬁ xed between both parties. The mainland 
Chinese went over the boundary and experienced Hong Kong 
as a place of their authentic cultural practice. What is this exotic 
itinerary really about for them? Now, let’s enter into mainland 
Chinese tourist’s experience world.
The island of Hong Kong is in the subtropical belt, so people 
tend to think the weather in Hong Kong is very hot and humid: 
but contrary to people’s expectation Hong Kong has rather a 
moderate climate. In 1933, a mainland Chinese tourist Zhang 
(1905-1960) (張若谷) was deeply moved by the natural, tropical 
environment of Hong Kong which made him feel as if in a 
dreamland. “How beautiful is the name Hong Kong! It literally 
means ‘fragrant harbor.’ As one of the top ﬁ ve commercial 
docks in China, Hong Kong is a paradise that attracts many 
outsiders and world tourists. The weather is always good, hot, 
and fresh. Its name reminds us of a fantasy island or a love 
land with sun, sea, sandy beaches, successive mountains, palm 
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trees, and lovely barefoot girls, etc.” His impression of Hong 
Kong reads like an advertising slogan for South Paciﬁ c tourism. 
Another Chinese tourist Yang (1983) (楊産岐) shared Zhang’s 
awe in 1941, but attributed it more speciﬁ cally to … “If you ask 
me what is the best thing in Hong Kong, I’d like to say it’s the 
HSBC Main Building. This white building is the most beautiful 
and unequaled out of this world, especially in harmony with the 
green Victoria Peak. It’s a masterpiece made by the British!.”
Yang’s description gives a view that the impact of Hong Kong’s 
exotic scenery mostly comes from the harmony between the 
natural environment and the products of modernization. Jin 
who traveled to Hong Kong in 1933 (Li, 1904-2005) was also 
impressed by the Peak Tram which safely carried passengers 
without stopping to the top of Victoria Peak. He exclaimed in 
delight in seeing the view from the summit. “There are green 
trees washed in the sunshine, cobalt seawaters and multi-colored 
western houses everywhere!” (Ba Jin 1983). Such an image on 
Hong Kong in the gaze of mainland Chinese tourists makes us 
feel that Hong Kong was a completely modernized big city in 
those days. The formation of “modern” image of Hong Kong goes 
back to the late Qing Dynasty. Some social reformers at the end 
of Qing Dynasty regarded Hong Kong as an “Occident” within 
easy reach. Kang (1858-1927) (康有为) wrote the following in 
his chronological diary: “While traveling through Hong Kong 
I saw the beauty of Western-style buildings, the cleanliness of 
paved roads, and the maintenance of public order. Westerners 
have their well-organized systems in the running of the (nation-) 
state. I deeply recognized that they should no longer be treated 
as formerly known Western Barbarians (Kang, 1992).”
If Hong Kong was viewed as a metaphor or model for modern 
reformation at the end of Qing dynasty, it became the object of 
“envy” transformed into a mirage under British control in the 
gaze of mainland Chinese tourists during the period of Republic 
of China. “Yesterday, Hong Kong was a lonely island with 
desolate rocks and ﬁ shermen. Today, it has not only changed 
into a grand city in Asia, but also a city of openness in the 
southern part of China, since the Britain received this amazing 
gift. The once forlorn island became a ‘mirage’ with the densest 
population. The beaches are adorned with race track, ballroom, 
tennis court, and golf links, like the Garden of Eden. Everywhere 
one feels the British’s commanding presence. All Chinese here 
have a comfortable life under the Union Jack which ﬂ oats 
supreme (Zhang, 1993).”
Why did such an embellished image of Hong Kong as a modern 
utopia become much stronger than before? A clue to this question 
can be found in a comment by Mu (1983) (穆时英) who visited 
Hong Kong in 1938: “Hong Kong is not only an island of dream 
and poetry, but a holy land of love and romance. Since the 
beginning of the battle of Shanghai, Hong Kong has changed 
into the one and only safest and contemporary city in the whole 
China (Mu, 1983).” The more mainland China was caught in 
the maelstrom of war in resisting Japanese invasion from 1937 
to 1945, the more enviable Hong Kong became. “There is no ﬁ t 
place to live in peace, to buy real estate or to start a business in 
China, except in the case of Hong Kong (Pei, 1983).” Thus, most 
mainland Chinese aspired to enter Hong Kong in those days. If 
Hong Kong was the most enviable place to live for them, did 
they make light of the agony of being under British protection? 
Some of mainland Chinese tourists were keen to detect the 
contradiction of modernity in the contrast of light and dark that 
Hong Kong had as the emblem of modernity. “At an inn a guest 
next door made vociferous love with a prostitute all night, so 
I couldn’t sleep. It reminds me of many aphrodisiac ads and 
commercials published in Hong Kong newspapers (Xi, 1983).” 
Vis-à-vis the light and dark side of Hong Kong some of them 
showed a more divided psychology or identity. For example, 
Wen (1983) (文兪) who visited Hong Kong in 1940 expressed 
the following: “Being pleased with Hong Kong as a place of 
peace and stability may be the product of sensation, but I can 
never love it.” After lengthy soul-searching and reﬂ ection, he 
arrived at this conclusion: “While staying in this famous and 
beautiful city I was trying to discover Hong Kong as it really 
is. Now I’m bitterly disappointed at the corrupt reality of Hong 
Kong. I’m sorry, but I hate Hong Kong! I’m more and more 
interested in disclosing dirtiness and poverty, than loving peace 
and stability prevailing in Hong Kong.”
This awareness of the contradiction of modernity by the 
mainland Chinese was deeper with their consciousness that the 
light of Hong Kong was not ultimately created by the Chinese, 
but the British. “Hong Kong is so lovely. It is all surrounded by 
blue seawaters, and green islands spread out in every direction. 
The vast nature makes our heart open, fresh sea winds wash 
away our weary and careworn anguish in the mundane world. 
Furthermore, there is a ﬂ ourishing material civilization in Hong 
Kong. So, why is it that we don’t want to fall in love with Hong 
Kong? If you are Caucasian, you must love Hong Kong madly, 
and Hong Kong loves you too. Unhappily, if you are Mongolian, 
even more unhappily if you are Chinese who was the owner 
of Hong Kong in the past, but now becomes a slave, how 
would you govern Hong Kong? (Xu, 1935)” Unhappily for the 
Chinese, which is not only a yellow race, but enslaved, the only 
way to escape this divided psychology was to take a moralizing 
position by criticizing the modern achievements of Hong Kong 
as a product of imperialistic invasion. As a result, the image of 
Hong Kong as the victim of imperialism began to progressively 
take shape.
Wang (1983) (王志成), who went to Hong Kong in 1932, 
described Hong Kong as a terrestrial paradise that seemed 
to exist outside of this world, but he wrote at the end of his 
journey: “Oh, my friend! The Westerner dug roads and built 
bridges by squeezing the blood out of our Chinese people. What 
are they (infrastructure of Hong Kong) really good for? At the 
top of Victoria Peak, I bitterly felt the viciousness of economic 
imperialism.” Hong Kong, viewed as the victim of imperialism, 
was often compared to a “limb” separated from a maternal body, 
to a “concubine for others” who was once a family member, or 
to a lost baby crying for its mother.
This image-making of Hong Kong as a “part of China (or the 
great Chinese body)” leads us to the discrimination Chinese 
citizens felt living in Hong Kong. The discrimination against the 
Chinese was visibly seen in the segregation of residential space 
between Westerners and the majority of Hong Kong Chinese. 
“The commerce in the Hong Kong market is mostly run by 
Chinese merchants, but Westerners live comfortably at the top of 
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the mountain with fresh air and breathtaking views (Du, 1983).” 
It was said to even prevent the migration of Chinese residents 
to this exclusive residential area located on the mountain. This 
Sino-centric view of considering Hong Kong as a part cut off 
from the main body of China continues to this day, forming 
the dominant discourse of mainland Chinese historiography. 
If we apply this view to Hong Kong’s nearly 150-year history, 
all Hong Kong history becomes “colonial.” It is, of course, the 
great China-centered history which is often far from the sense of 
reality of Hong Kong people. Since October 2004, the Chinese 
government has attempted to inculcate a national consciousness 
in Hong Kong people by broadcasting the national anthem of 
the Republic of China on Hong Kong TV. Nonetheless, not only 
do Hong Kong people still have a “pluralistic” view of history, 
but their national identity is also more ﬂ exible and not being 
propelled toward unconditional loyalty.
In addition to the boundary between Westerners and the Hong 
Kong Chinese, mainland Chinese tourists also felt another 
boundary among themselves: That is, a social gap between the 
Chinese elite and the upper classes who enjoyed all the beneﬁ ts 
in collaboration with British colonial authorities and the Chinese 
lower classes. In fact, the British favored elite-based policies by 
dividing Hong Kong inhabitants. For example, they recruited 
Indian and Shandong people for their police services who could 
not communicate with the majority of Hong Kong Cantonese 
(98%). Let’s listen to the personal experience story of Lu Xun 
(鲁迅), one of the major Chinese writers of the 20th century, 
who traveled to the “paradise of the British” in September 1927. 
“Unlike a healthy complexion of Guangzhou inspector, he looks 
as pale as a living corpse. He doesn’t listen to me and keeps on 
digging all around in my luggage, until I give him a bribe.” In 
his travel notes, Lu Xun wanted to lampoon the social hierarchy 
among Hong Kong residents. “Hong Kong is an island, but it is 
also a picture vividly showing the present and future of many 
provinces in China. There are a handful of Western masters 
in the center, some Chinese elite and upper class who praise 
the virtue of their masters, slavelike compatriots who act as 
the running dogs and ﬁ nally ethnic minorities who endure 
hardship. Some of them die from overwork along the seashore 
and/or run away to the mountain; therefore, these Miao and Yao 
people are our vanguards (Lu, 1983).” After indicating a multi-
layered hierarchy in Hong Kong society, he was also aware of 
China’s potential to become a Western colony at some time or 
other when this hierarchical colonial system spreads across the 
continent. To prevent such a “dark” image of Hong Kong and 
a hongkongnization of future China, mainland Chinese tourists 
insisted that Chinese Hong Kongnese should not set their goal 
on social promotion within the category of vertical hierarchy, 
but they should resolutely break it down to have an authentic 
Chinese identity (or Chineseness). In 1939, Lu (陸丹林) 
criticized that ordinary Chinese students in Hong Kong studied 
very hard to live in comfort and to serve the British government 
or foreign business ﬁ rms. “I hope that ‘too much westernized’ 
Chinese students at Hong Kong University will not become 
‘Huang (yellow)’ white races who lose their self-identity and 
homeland in their spirit, ideal, and daily life.” That is just the 
melancholic image of Hong Kong viewed by mainland Chinese 
travelers, from their anti-imperialist and nationalist perspective.
If so, how did the people of Hong Kong react to this Sino-
centric view? There is no direct document on the opinions 
of Hong Kong Chinese viz. the travel notes of the mainland 
Chinese. Anyway, judging by Lu’s moan, we can assume that 
there would be many Hong Kong Chinese eager to be “yellow-
colored” Caucasian. However, we cannot hastily conclude that 
all of them had no Chinese identity because the composition of 
the Hong Kong population was so intertwined. 60 years after 
the British takeover of Hong Kong, the population multiplied by 
50, and most of them came from mainland China. On the other 
hand, Hong Kong Chinese began to qualitatively distinguish 
overseas Chinese (Hua qiao) from ethnic Chinese (Hua ren). 
The former refers to the Chinese residing in countries other 
than China with Chinese citizenship, in contrast to the latter 
which refers to those with the citizenship of their host country. 
The nationality policy of these two nations (UK/China) who 
had a stake in Hong Kong was relatively evident. The British 
proclaimed that all Hong Kong residents were the Queen’s 
subjects, According to the principle of dual nationality both 
overseas Chinese and ethnic Chinese were recorded as the 
same, regardless of citizenship on the ofﬁ cial documents of the 
Hong Kong government ofﬁ ce. Unlike Hong Kong under the 
British rule, the Qing Dynasty and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) considered all of them as Chinese citizens based 
on jus sanguinis.
To date now, we’ve observed two images of Hong Kong: 
“Modernity and national disgrace” through the experiential 
world of mainland Chinese tourists. On the surface, these two 
images appeared contradictory, but they were two sides of the 
same coin in the internal modern experiential world of mainland 
China. These mainlanders had something in common. They were 
“middle class” in the mainland China’s cities and recorded their 
notes after traveling to Hong Kong. The Hong Kong that they 
observed personally was no more than their experiential world 
more intensely portrayed through their cultural propensity. Thus, 
their experiential world did not necessarily coincide with that of 
the Hong Kong Chinese as the observed.
Hong Kong Chinese speak Cantonese and have a localized or 
“hongkongnized” cultural identity between Chinese and Western 
cultures. They attempted to internalize two heterogeneous 
cultures: West and East and to ﬁ nd their self-sustaining cultural 
identity. Hong Kong Chinese formed a colonial modern world 
holding 9 out of 10 lands on the Hong Kong island that mainland 
Chinese rulers conceded to the “other.” In 1935 Song (培淞) 
remarked on this point. “The vitality of Hong Kong was already 
held by Hong Kong Chinese. What remains to be restored is only 
the governing sovereignty.” Even though Hong Kong society was 
under British rule, the small-scale colonial government claimed 
to advocate the non-interventionism of laissez-faire economics. 
Even the functions of the central bank - presumed to be held by 
the government - didn’t formally exist in Hong Kong, therefore, 
they were in the hands of private industry groups or commerce 
chambers. After the victory of Chinese Revolutionaries in 1949, 
the massive “ﬂ ight of capital” from mainland China was headed 
for the industrialization through the world market under the 
principle of survival of the ﬁ ttest. In this context, Hong Kong 
government not only minimized political intervention, but also 
institutionalized an economy-friendly climate enabling Hong 
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Kong enterprises to respond to rapid changes in the world 
market trends and use their creativity.
It is worth noting that Hong Kongnese, who had hardly ever 
spoken out against the government during the colonial period, 
showed unprecedented public activism on the Memorial Day for 
Hong Kong‘s return, for fearing the Chinese government would 
infringe on their rights. Thus, the “dominant discourse” of Hong 
Kong is tacitly to compare the colonial period with post-colonial 
one, and further to oppose Hong Kong to mainland China. By 
the same token, Hong Kong capitalists have been investing 
heavily on the mainland for the past decade, particularly in 
Shenzen province. The Chinese Communist Party bosses talk of 
China after the reuniﬁ cation as “one country, two systems,” but 
the reality is that Hong Kong’s capitalism is the model for the 
future of the country as a whole.
Therefore, we cannot necessarily consider the colonial history 
of Hong Kong as “dark and gloomy,” from the perspective of 
Chinese nationalism or Sino-centrism. This question is directly 
linked with the debate on “colonial modernity,” but it is not 
advisable to take a dualistic approach to the so-called transition 
into modernity taking sides with anti-imperialist nationalism 
or pro-colonialism. Retrospectively, Chinese nationalism or 
irredentism is twofold. In the development process of modern 
and contemporary history, China experienced a semi-colonialism 
and lived under the crisis consciousness of being divided at 
anytime by imperialist nations. Thus, she had supported the 
resistance nationalism (national independence and racial self-
determination), but nowadays she ruthlessly suppresses the 
separatist ethnic movements in Tibet and Xinjiang. Yat-sun Sun 
(1866-1925) known as “the father of the nation” openly said that 
“small, peripheral nations like Chosun (old Korea) will come 
back to us as the previous tributary nations if China recovers 
a superpower status.” In his three principles of the people 
(nationalism, democracy, and the livelihood of the people), the 
nationalism is just a revolutionary’s political rhetoric, rather 
than a lofty idea.
In this regard, the observation of a contemporary Korean tourist 
who traveled to Hong Kong during the Japanese colonial period 
is worthy of notice. “I’d like to respect the Hong Kong Chinese 
as the world’s ﬁ rst citizens. Even though they got the help of 
Westerners in their city planning and plotting, it is true that the 
miracle of Hong Kong was mostly made by their own blood and 
sweat. Hong Kong is a British overseas territory, but Hong Kong 
Chinese take control of economy (Whang, 1930).”
Modern tourism to Busan during the Japanese occupation: 
Tourism of passive modernity based on coloniality
The modern city is not only a trance of consumerism, but also 
a showcase of the rich-poor gap where the light and shadow of 
modern capitalist society coexist in stark contrast. The colonial 
city, in particular, has a dualistic structure where civilized and 
non-civilized worlds are anachronically intertwined in their non-
contemporariness. In a colony, the creation of tourist attractions 
is closely related to the imperial politics. For example, tourism 
gives citizens of the empire an opportunity to watch an 
underdeveloped society, but it is also used as an instrument to 
internalize the legitimacy of colonial rule for the colonized. 
Now, let’s travel to Busan under the Japanese colonial rule 
(1910-1945) with our nostalgic gaze of a colonial past.
When did modern tourism start on the Korean peninsula? It 
originated from the Japanese ruling era when main railroad 
networks were built. The ﬁ rst ads for attracting mass tourist 
parties to Korean scenic spots in 1915 paved the way for the 
advent of a new consumer culture of tourism (Kim, 2010). The 
Japanese colonial government promoted a variety of Korean 
experiences, including kisaeng (Korean female courtesan), 
Mount Kumgang, modern cities, hot-spring resorts, and various 
scenic spots. The Japanese government, the government-
afﬁ liated railway bureau, and the travel association all took part 
in promoting tourism through tourist services, distribution of 
tour guidebooks, and newspaper advertisements, etc. During 
the colonial era, only the Japanese and some Korean privileged 
class could participate in sightseeing tours, but most Chosun 
(old Korea) people were excluded from such a modern leisure 
culture. The Japanese tried to beautify oppressive colonial 
reality, to alleviate resistant ideology, and to justify colonial rule 
through tourism.
What impact did modern tourism have on colonial Chosun 
people? As mentioned above, the Japanese used tourism as a tool 
to propagandize Japanese colonial achievement after the Korea/
Japan annexation in 1910. The popularization of modern tourism 
was mainly based on the discrimination between the colonizer 
and the colonized. The success of the ﬁ rst travel agency “Thomas 
Cook and Son” was due to the great vogue of international 
colonial expositions and trips to overseas colonies. The 
exposition was an imperial event to justify the colonial rule from 
the civilization-barbarism duality. According to Sunya (2000), 
the exposition is a display of empire, a display of products, and 
an extravaganza. For example, the Chosun Local Products Fair 
in 1915 and the Chosun Exposition in 1929 provided the modern 
spaces where colonialism and tourism explicitly intersected, 
showing the time-space compression on the colonial fascism 
under the urgent project (emotional engineering) of making 
unassimilated Chosun people into loyal imperial subjects of 
the Japanese Emperor (Tenno). The Japanese Tenno-oriented 
culture may be considered as a colonial manifestation of fascism 
(Henry, 2008). Chosun people became aware of being “modern” 
by experiencing modern railway, accommodation, media 
advertising and tours with various themes and events (cherry 
blossom festivals, moon viewing events, the Buddha’s birthday 
tours, hot springs, beaches, department stores, restaurants, ski 
resorts, etc.).
The sights in Busan were Mt. Yong-du, Mt. Yong-mi, Dong-
nae hot spring, Kumgang Park, Beomeo temple, Haeundae 
beach. Busan tourist attractions were recreated as a space of 
imagination with leisure, consumption, and production. After 
the opening of Busan harbor, the Dong-nae hot spring was 
developed by the Japanese consul Maeda. The ﬁ rst Japanese inn 
Yasushi was opened in 1898. Another two inns (Kwangwol-lu 
and Bong-nae) built in 1903 were reserved for the Japanese 
only. For example, the Bong-nae inn came close to a modern 
leisure complex town having 36 rooms, with garden areas of 
6611 m2 where visitors enjoyed ﬁ shing and boating in artiﬁ cial 
ponds and children played at the zoo. With the development of 
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Dong-nae hot spa resort, Japanese style hot spring culture was 
brought to Korea. The hot spa was not only a place to take a 
bath, but also a decadent entertainment establishment with 
Korean kisaeng’s performance. In 1920, the public bath was 
established by the Japanese in Pyongyang, but most Chosun 
people infused with Confucian moral customs strongly opposed 
this as they considered taking bath in public a disgraceful act of 
the low classes.
After the new construction of the great bath, the Dong-nae hot 
spa resort was run by tour packages (bath and cheap return street 
car tickets). With the cherry blossom festival in April each year, 
the Dong-nae hot spa was widely known as the nation’s largest 
resort. Until the liberation in 1945, it was overﬂ owing with busy 
and bustling inns. After the 1970s, new tourist attractions and the 
leisure industry were booming all over the country thanks to the 
rapid economic growth. Nowadays it keeps its past reputation 
alive.
With the division between daily life space (center) and deviant 
space (periphery), the representation of the hot spring is 
differentiated according to the periods. For most Korean colonial 
writers, the hot spring resort was not an esthetic feature, but a 
heterogeneous space where the prosperity of bourgeois culture 
and the despair of alienated beings dramatically overlapped. 
In an institutionalized spring and winter leisure place, many 
anonymous “others” ﬂ ocked from all quarters, shared secrets 
and had romantic affairs. As a feast of nudes, the hot spring was 
negatively described as a space of rape, fraud, suicide, lost love, 
and a likely place for crime in colonial literature.
How has the meaning of hot spring been redeﬁ ned in the 
process of modernization? Korean classic mythology did not 
only explain the birth of the Korean nation through the union 
of heaven and water, but also invested rivers, hot springs and 
seas with sanctity, by comparing water to women or women’s 
capacity to give birth. The transformation of classical sacred 
water into secular public baths, hot spas and beaches connoted 
the change of paradigm on space representation that is to say that 
of Korean society’s moral and lifestyle. The classical image of 
water previously compared to women began to be masculinized 
in modern society, because the advent of modernity was 
closely linked with the process of pioneering colonies through 
imperialist adventures and navigations (Mitchell, 2000). After 
the 1920s the positive images of the sea or challenging adventure 
sailing were degraded into a sorrowful space of subjugated class 
in the process of colonization or a hotbed of youth depravity in 
the development of modern consumption culture.
The hot spa resort was not only a place of fantasy romance 
to escape from daily routine, but also a foothold of imperial 
dominance over the colonial Chosun’s everyday life. When the 
Railway Bureau of the Japanese Governor General received the 
right to manage the Chosun railroad from the South Manchuria 
Railway in 1924, the hot spa resort was reorganized as a 
dual space where commercialization of leisure mingled with 
colonialism under the control of the Governor General. Only 
the bourgeois class with time and money and colonial rulers 
could go to hot spas, inns, hotels, and seaside villas. For Korean 
intellectuals in the colonial period, the romance of a luxury 
resort was not an object of admiration, but a target of satire and 
criticism. The image of purifying water through the alliance of 
life, birth and femininity in classical mythology was transformed 
into sexuality and decadence in the process of commercialization 
and colonialism. Colonial novels described modern spa resorts 
as a space where the devil-like sexual desire of the bourgeois 
class destroyed feminine chastity. For example, the Dong-nae 
hot spa represented a space of “Eros-modernity” instigating 
consumption and pleasure by color, warmth, splendor and carnal 
desire, beyond Logos-modernity (space of education, discipline 
and hard labor). Modern leisure is not derived from authentic 
deviation or freedom from daily routine but dominated by the 
Logos, in other words, commercialization of Eros. In Korean 
popular novels in the 1930s, the hot spa resort was exoterically 
described as a dangerous place where women were lured and 
easily fell prey to the world, the ﬂ esh, and the devil in the 
patriarchal gaze of watching the female body, and/or of invoking 
the ruler’s dominant power.
For example, the Korean writer Yi’s (1892-1950) novel, 
Renaissance (1924) showed the process of degradation of 
a new woman (that is, a woman with a modern education) 
in the hot spa resort. The heroine called “Sun-young” who 
played an active part as a leader of female students in the 1919 
Independence Movement of Korea lost her public self - after 
the failure of the 1919 movement - by choosing the money 
of a rich man instead of the true love of a young student. She 
went down into degradation and ﬁ nally committed suicide. The 
conﬂ icts of their love triangle unfolded in new spa resorts along 
the Gyeongbu Line, Gyeongin Line, Gyeongwon Line, etc. In 
Yi’s subsequent novels the hot spa was often depicted as a space 
of depravity, which contaminated and degraded the bodies of 
female students.
In the 18th century Jane Austen wrote Northanger Abbey 
(1818) and Persuasion (1818) set in the spa city of Bath as a 
romantic background of bourgeois sociability. In the 1930s, 
Yasunari Kawabata (1899-1972) represented an esthetic world 
in The Dancing Girl of Izu (1926) or in Snow Country set in 
famous spa towns such as Izu or Niigata. However, Korean-
style narration on hot spas under colonial modernity could no 
longer sympathize with the atmosphere of romantic esthetics. 
In modern Korean novel the hot spa resort was presented as 
a “stage of terror,” of sensual desire, and of criminality. This 
terror was not only limited to the body of new women in their 
ﬁ rst contact with the hot spa, but also inﬂ uenced young male 
intellectuals who experienced the temptation of the hot spa, 
and lost their purity or virginity to the power of capital or the 
nudity of women. Japanese Professor Sano (2003) analyzed 
the common representations of tourism in Chinese, Korean 
and Japanese novels in the 1930s by designating the 1930s at 
the “travel period.” However, while space may be identical, 
the meaning is differentiated in the travel of intellectuals of 
the three countries (China, Korean and Japan). Contrary to 
the pink romance of the young bourgeois in Bath or the short-
lived romance with a dancer or with a geisha in a dreamy hot 
spa setting, the voyeurism on the sexuality of new women 
in a colonial Chosun society is closely related to the process 
where modern intellectual men establish their subjecthood by 
demonizing women’s bodies and virgin fetishism (Yim, 2005).
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Up until now, we analyzed the commercialization of modern 
amusement facilities centering on the Dong-nae hot spa 
resort, but the most representative cultural heritages in Busan 
were the Beomo temple and Busan wall-fortress known as 
Jaseong-dae. The Beomo temple produced many old Zen and 
new enlightened monks in the turbulent era of the Korean 
Empire (1897-1910) in taking the lead in the modernization of 
Buddhism and the propagation of modern education. However, 
it was doomed to experience a colonial modernity under 
Japanese imperialism. The Japanese transformed the Buddhist 
temples from the place of Zen meditation or training of the mind 
into commercial tourist attractions easily accessible to general 
public under the guise of modernization. During the colonial 
period, Chosun people became the subjects of modern tourism 
consumption through the products of modern civilization 
such as Fairs and Expos, which attracted many visitors, the 
reorganization of places of natural beauty and historic interest 
in connection with railroads, and the planning of all year round 
tours. When groups of Chosun tourists became the “seers,” 
would they understand what kind of image or perception came 
in sight? Tourism is not always to see what is seen, but to see 
what is intended to be seen. In that regard, there was a subtle 
difference in perspective between the Japanese and the Korean 
during the colonial period. The tourist gaze of Japanese people 
who travelled to Korea in the 1890s before and after the First 
Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) was mainly ﬁ xed on Korean 
dirty streets and houses, and lazy Chosun people who suffered 
from corruption according to their equation of cleanliness 
with civilization or uncleanliness with barbarianism. They 
didn’t miss talking about the historical battleﬁ elds during the 
Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-1598). This revival of lost 
collective memory of the Japanese invasion of Korea reﬂ ected 
well the Japanese psychology or mentality of self-complacency 
in conﬁ rming and justifying the qualiﬁ cation of the Japanese 
Empire. For example, the Busan wall-fortress called Jaseong-
dae was built by the Japanese warlord Mori Terumoto in 1593. 
Thus, the Japanese tourists who stayed in Busan were ﬁ lled 
with emotion toward the Busan wall-fortress. Even though the 
Japanese had the way of sea reclamation by demolishing Mt. 
Jaseong-dae before and after the 1930s, they pressed ahead 
with the project of reclamation without touching any part of 
the Busan wall-fortress.
On the other hand, what did Chosun people think of Japan after 
the Japanese Annexation of Korea in 1910? The catchphrase of 
“Korean tourist party to Japan” was planned as part of political 
propaganda programs by the Japanese Government General 
of Korea after the 1919 independence movement of Korea, 
in order to calm the anti-Japanese sentiment among Chosun 
people. As a result, dispatching Korean tourist parties to Japan 
ﬂ ourished between 1920 and 1922. By changing the name of 
the Chosun Tourist Party to the “Chosun Inspection Party,” the 
Japanese showed them thriving Japanese cities, industrial plants, 
expositions and historical monuments, in order to impress them 
with the supremacy of Japanese modern civilization, and to 
make them aware of their backwardness. Thus, Korean tourists 
in Japan were not only the “seers” to watch modern Japan as a 
barbarian or inferior being, but also the seen by the Japanese. The 
Japanese government controlled all tour programs. As originally 
intended by the Japanese, selected Chosun people who visited 
Japan started to praise Japanese civilization and to internalize 
their self-abasement.
Until now, we have examined the double-sidedness of tourism, 
that is, colonialism and modernism, the commercialization of 
modern recreational facilities and historical monuments in 
Busan, and ﬁ nally the intersection of two opposed gazes of 
Japanese and Korean tourists during the Japanese occupation. In 
colonial Chosun, modern tourism was started in the process of 
capitalization and modernization. Colonial tourism served as a 
ﬁ eld trip or as a political class to study imperialism, to conﬁ rm 
territorial expansion, and to indoctrinate colonial subjects with 
imperial consciousness. Especially for Chosun people who 
entered the domain of modern tourism as the seen rather than as 
the seers, it was the process of sinking in the Japanese imperial 
politics and colonial assimilation policy. The Japanese produced 
various postcards and travel brochures for publicizing trips to 
colonial Chosun. Through this propagation of modern tourism, 
not only Japanese tourists but Chosun people also increasingly 
became the subjects of tourist consumption. During the Japanese 
occupation, the most important task of modern tourism in Busan 
was to incite the self-humiliation of colonial Chosun people on 
the basis of imperialist policy, passive modernity, and to form a 
new consumption culture or an outlet for hedonism (Kim, 2010).
Japanese School Excursion to Okinawa with 
Anti-war-Pacifi sm
There are few people who know that Japan is the birthplace of 
school excursions. It is not only a very important stage of the life 
cycle, but also key to understanding “group tour culture” in the 
Japanese archipelago. Graburn (1983) has called Japan perhaps 
“the best organized in the world for mass internal travel,” but 
Japan is also a frontrunner in propagating the image of group 
tourists throughout the world. Many Europeans and Americans 
like to poke fun at Japanese tourists who follow a guide carrying 
a ﬂ ag, but in the 1980s the Japanese started to travel alone or in 
small groups with friends or relatives.
Japanese school excursions as a part of the curriculum consist of 
typical group tours where hundreds of students in uniform parade 
according to their ﬁ xed schedule. It is quite different from the 
image of active tourism of exploring, ever deepening recognition 
on others and self-rediscovery through the encounter with 
unknown world. Japanese students are mobilized in the name 
of learning, but they cannot usually take the lead in their own 
school excursion. As the principal agents are heteronomously 
mobilized, this passive pattern of tourism may be more common 
in a totalitarian society. In fact, Japanese school excursions 
were recognized as an example of Tennoization (kominka) or 
militarism operated in the ﬁ eld of education after the Meiji 
Restoration in 1866.
Especially in the 1930s when Japan pushed ahead with the 
nationalization of the tourism industry at state level, the Japanese 
school excursion trip to Manchuria under Japanese rule was 
tactically used as a forum for acquiring cultural sensitivity and 
for the subjects of the Empire to preliminarily deal with the 
system of all-out war. According to Yoich (1998), the imperial 
consciousness is composed of racial discrimination, great-power 
chauvinism, and the mission to propagate civilization. In this 
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sense, the school excursion was a ﬁ eld work to enjoy Japanese 
national pride for being the imperial subject or for having 
leadership in the Asian world. Japanese students taking part in 
the school excursion trip to Manchuria were more interested 
in the “Japan in Manchuria” or “Japanized Manchuria” than 
in Manchuria itself. They wrote uniformly, “I no longer feel 
that I’m in Manchuria” or “Among us there are few people 
who believe themselves to be in Manchuria.” As a result, they 
saw “Japan and Japanese” in Manchuria, instead of observing 
“Manchurian or Chinese society and Manchurians.” For 
example, it is impressionistic to read a travel journal on Dalian 
(ﬁ rst trade port in Manchuria) written by the 4th year students 
of Liberal Arts in the 10th year of the Showa Era (1935): “We 
stared at the great building equipment, at the dock in wide-
eyed amazement. Modern Dalian originated from a Qingniwa 
(blue mud swamp) was a small ﬁ shing village of 50 houses. The 
Dalian was completed by the Japanese after passing through 
Russian domination in 1898. The prosperity of Dalian with 
500,000 people, as a window of new Manchurian nation, is a 
constant source of surprise and admiration. In looking back on 
the greatness of the Japanese people who modernized Dalian 
beyond recognition, I gaze in awe at the potential energy of our 
people.”
For them, Manchuria was no longer recognized as the other 
or othering, but as selﬁ zation or Japanization. It was not only 
idealized as a memorial space of Empire directly linked with the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), but also as a “show window” 
of the Empire used to parade its capitalistic achievements. “Far 
from receiving Manchurian energy, we feel strongly that we 
are Japanese in Manchuria more than we were in Japan. We are 
surprised that we Japanese have magniﬁ cently rallied Manchurian 
(sub-) cultures under the banner of Japanese cultures. In order 
to further japanize this splendid city, Japanese farmers should 
plant more Japanese powers here (Travel notes…)” The original 
meaning of tourism in Chinese characters is to look at the 
civilization of other countries, but it is paradoxically transformed 
into a collective narcissism to reconﬁ rm the superiority of 
homeland civilization, or to encourage the mission of civilizing 
local barbarians. In fact, the participants of the school excursion 
in Manchuria did not see as they saw it, but they choose to see 
what they wanted to see (Yim, 2011).
Due to the fall of the Japanese Empire, school excursions 
were in decline, but with the rapid growth and recovery of the 
Japanese economy, it is again ﬂ ourishing quantitatively, as well 
as qualitatively. The importance of experience studies (farm, 
ﬁ shery, and woodcraft, etc.) was stressed in the program of 
school excursions. In 1970s the school ski trips began. Since the 
1980s the Japanese have started overseas school trips and have 
extended their visits from Korea to China, Australia, the US, 
the UK, and so on. Nowadays, many Japanese people tend to 
reject the old-styled totalitarian school excursions and to value a 
more future-oriented edutainment tour program to keep up with 
globalization.
Retrospectively, the ﬁ rst Japanese school excursion was over 
100 years ago. Some have reproached that school excursions have 
few educational beneﬁ ts in contemporary society as they take a 
serious view on “collectivity” while autonomy and individuality 
are relatively neglected. Nonetheless, it is very important to 
understand Japanese group tour culture according to the stages 
of life cycle (kindergarten tour in the infant stage, company 
staff tour in the mature stage, retirement tour in the senescent 
stage) (Watkins, 2008). Even today, Japanese school excursion 
programs boast almost 100% practice and participation rate. 
Among the social networks made by the medium of tourism, 
Japanese school excursions enjoy popularity and longevity.
In relation to the school excursion in the post-war period, let’s 
travel to Okinawa, the exotic pseudo-foreign resort of Japan, to 
see the “tower of Himeyuri (star lily)” which is one of the most 
visited sites by Japanese school excursions in the name of “peace 
education.” In Okinawa, the place of the last and bloodiest battle 
of the Paciﬁ c War, compulsory mobilization and genocide were 
the extreme results of Tennoization and assimilation policy 
during the imperial period (1868-1945). In total, an estimated 
122,000 Okinawan civilians were killed during the battle of 
Okinawa. The number of deaths came to over one-third of the 
indigenous population and even exceeded the combined death 
toll of the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Rottman, 
2004).
The most symbolic, poorest victim was the corps of Himeyuri, 
namely 15-19 years old Okinawan schoolgirls conscripted 
as nurses. The tragic story of Himeyuri has been made into 
movies, documentary ﬁ lms, soap operas, dramas, songs, 
ballets, even animation covering such a wide range of genres. 
How and why did the Himeyuri story - where 123 of the total 
222 were killed - represent the sacriﬁ ce of Okinawa which 
caused more than 100,000 casualties? Why were most movies 
and documentary ﬁ lms on Himeyuri produced exclusively on 
the mainland and not in Okinawa? In these representations, 
even though a considerable number of Himeyuri girl students 
survived, it appeared as if they were all killed, for example in 
the most representative anti-war movie entitled The Tower of 
Himeyuri (1953) directed by Tadashi Imai (1912-1991) in the 
post-war period. Consequently, this anti-war movie tacitly 
conveys an equivalent image between Himeyuri corps and 
suicide to the audience.
The visual media has exercised a great inﬂ uence over the 
formation of Japanese opinion on the war in the post-war period 
(Makita, 2000). As the most representative subjects of Japanese 
post-war ﬁ lms, we can enumerate kamikaze, Japanese battleship 
Yamato, Tokyo air raids, atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and ﬁ nally Himeyuri corps. These ﬁ lms do not deal 
with Japanese military expansion such as the Russo-Japanese 
war or the Nanjing massacre, but the great damage Japanese 
people suffered at the closing stages of the Asia-Paciﬁ c war. 
They were propagandized to the public as powerfully “anti-
war” or “anti-war-peace” movies. Among them the movies on 
Himeyuri are considered classic (Sato, 1982).
Why was the story of Himeyuri so actively accepted, repeated 
and reproduced on the mainland? As Yoich (2003) indicated, 
“Tower of Himeyuri” played the role of “condensing” the battle 
of Okinawa into the deaths of innocent Himeyuri high school 
girls to incite audience emotions. Thereby, the blame of the 
Okinawan war was concealed in the mythicization of Himeyuri. 
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According to Oe (1970), the tower of Himeyuri has, for 
Japanese mainlanders, performed a cathartic function to defend 
them from the so-called “poison of Okinawa,” and to peacefully 
shed tears. The narration of Himeyuri made them avert their 
eyes from the poisons of Okinawa, such as deep-rooted conﬂ icts 
between the mainland and Okinawa, Japanese responsibility to 
make Okinawa a scapegoat, slaughter of Okinawan civilians by 
the military attack and compulsory suicides (Tanji, 2006).
After watching this anti-war movie in the group in Fukuoka, 
many school girls held a Buddhist ceremony to honor their 
innocent war victims. In Kumamoto, a memorial service 
was also held in honor of the dead. In rural areas, the train of 
Himeyuri was temporarily opened to transport moviegoers. Even 
in Okinawa people’s reaction to this ﬁ lm was enthusiastic. On 
the mainland, the Japanese interpreted this “grateful reaction” of 
Okinawan islanders to “Japan our homeland” for remembering 
the Okinawans themselves (Tadao, 1956). This is mainly due to 
the powerful narrative characters of this anti-war movie. It is far 
from the harsh behavior of the Japanese army toward “others” 
in Asia, and quite different from a war movie ﬁ ghting with the 
enemy forces, but ironically similar to a disaster movie where 
innocent people are on the run, attempting to evade mortal 
and imminent danger. Okinawa was the only place to ﬁ ght 
with the US army, but the narration of this ground battle was 
boldly omitted in the ﬁ lm. One of the strengths of the so-called 
Himeyuri myth is to make war ﬁ lms without describing any 
actual battle scenes. Instead, the ﬁ lm consists mainly of scenes 
where people hang between life and death under the threat of 
an imaginary enemy which is rarely seen as a disaster. Another 
strength of Hymeyuri myth is to evade answering the questions 
posed by war itself (the meaning of war or the responsibility of 
war) by generalizing it as the salvation of humanity standing in 
a life or death situation, instead of developing the hatred for the 
others. Therefore, the object of anti-war is not a speciﬁ c war in 
history like the Paciﬁ c war, but a general war.
It was Yoshida who destroyed the myth of Himeyuri by criticizing 
the coexistence of anti-war and martyrdom in the representation 
of the Himeyuri corps. In his book Himeyuri Chushingura (1993), 
Yoshida compared Himeyrui with Chushingura. The latter is the 
name for ﬁ ctionalized accounts of the historical revenge by the 
47 samurai for the death of their master, Asano Naganori. These 
two well-known stories have a common trait, in that they have 
the “esthetic of repetition” to stimulate the cultural sensibility of 
Japanese mainlanders.
The corps of Himeyuri is a convenient instrument for post-
war Japanese people to place themselves as war victims and 
“one community” with Okinawans. Japanese mainlanders and 
Okinawan islanders attacked and victimized by the American 
army are portrayed as “one Japanese,” being completely 
oblivious to the difference and opposition between them. 
However, this euphoric “imagination” of the Mainland Japanese 
was not necessarily ruptured by the real Okinawans. In the 
1960s, the back-to-homeland campaign in Okinawa, such as the 
anti-American movement, the raising of Japanese national ﬂ ag 
being prohibited on the mainland and the campaign for the use 
of standard language might form one of the mainland Japanese 
imaginative sources. In return, mainlanders remembered the 
battle of Okinawa as good material for spiritual unitization with 
Okinawa. In the south battleﬁ eld of Okinawa the monument 
memorial in honor of the dead was built, and in a passing tour 
bus a tour guide started to narrate the bravery of the Okinawa 
battleﬁ eld. On the spot of study through the peace education, the 
“convertibility” of the Japanese mainland damage image with 
Okinawan one is very strong, as we saw in the representation of 
anti-war movies on the Okinawa battle. Due to the convertibility 
between Okinawa and Japan, many Japanese students responded 
that the tower of Himeyuri was erected in Hiroshima in the 
survey of 1994; therefore, the corps of Himeyuri doesn’t 
necessarily mean the sacriﬁ ce of Okinawa, but is rather placed 
in the extension to the mainland’s damage including Hiroshima, 
Nagasaki and Okinawa (Yoshida, 2005). According to Watanabe 
(2001), the popular Japanese animation “Sailor Moon” by 
manga artist Naoko Takeuchi, was also inspired by the corps of 
Himeyuri. Nonetheless, not all stories of women who sacriﬁ ced 
themselves for the state were necessarily in the mass media 
spotlight.
In 1972, Okinawa was restored to Japan. Then the “poison of 
Okinawa,” as Kenzaburo Oe pointed out, reopened an old war 
wound. Contrary to the hope of the Okinawans to return to the 
homeland under the peace constitution, the placement of the 
Japanese self-defense forces in Okinawa reminded them of the 
damage caused by the Japanese military during the war, and the 
US bases have survived. After the recovery to Japan, Okinawa 
was no longer a remote island residing in the imagination 
of mainlanders but became a part of Japan. As a result, the 
terms of “genocide” or “collective suicides” were recorded in 
Japanese textbooks, instead of the euphemistic term “sacriﬁ ce 
of Himeyuri corps.” However, the triangular composition of 
the peace education: Hiroshima-Nagasaki-Okinawa still seems 
to be a lukewarm anti-war paciﬁ sm through the veriﬁ cation of 
Japan’s one-sided damage, as seen in the anti-war movies.
If so, what are really the “authentic” anti-war elements to be 
narrated in an anti-war movie?
For the Okinawans, the daily disciplines they experienced 
under the colonial ruling state were immediately transformed 
into military ones in a state of war, and into collective/mass 
suicides in the end. This gradual three-stage course of the 
Okinawan tragedy should uncover the truth. For the neighboring 
countries, it is anticipated that Japan will admit the existence of 
others and their damages, not the unilateral damage of Japan, 
for example stressed through the sacriﬁ ce of innocent Himeyuri 
girls: Japan was damaged; therefore, we Japanese have turned 
against war. It’s a very conservative anti-war view, but this anti-
war narrative has played an important role in concealing the 
opposition between the mainland and Okinawa, and in forgetting 
Japan’s war crimes during World War II (WWII). Even in the 
21st century this anti-war narrative is heterogeneously consumed 
in a conservative mold.
When the Crown Prince and Princess, who visited Okinawa on 
July 17, 1975, to attend the opening ceremony of the Okinawa 
Marine Exposition, paid their respects at the tower of Himeyuri, 
two Okinawans threw ﬁ rebombs at them. This abortive 
accident can be read by the Okinawan reaction to the symbolic 
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representation the mainland Japanese has had viz. the tower of 
Himeyuri.
The number of school excursion trips to Okinawa is on the 
increase. In 1980, a little over 100 schools made tours to 
Okinawa. By 2006, a record high of 2615 schools arrived with 
439,823 students, accounting for nearly 10% of Okinawa’s 
tourist arrivals. Instead of just listening to an impressive tale of 
Himeyuri girls, the students are nowadays recommended to see 
the horrors of war as taking a step forward.
In his essay “Reﬂ ections on an Okinawan Gama,” Yuichiro 
(2010) introduces the readers to the so-called “gama shock” 
in Okinawa. “During their visit to a gama (cave in Okinawan), 
today’s high school students are briefed by a volunteer guide 
about what happened inside the cave. Then the guide asks the 
students to turn their ﬂ ashlights off. The moment of gama-
shock arrives. The students are mostly overwhelmed by horror. 
They come out into the daylight relieved and with a belief that 
war is cruel and peace so precious.” Criticizing this simplistic 
dichotomy between war and peace, he warned: “What we 
need to realize is the impossibility of re-experiencing the 
original. Okinawa should not be thought of as a destination for 
a Japanese school excursion of a traditional kind, designed to 
evoke the ghastly shadow of the nation. In national imaginings, 
as Renan stated more than a century ago, past fratricides must be 
consigned to oblivion (Yuichiro, 2010).”
Suddenly, I am reminded of another famous quote from the 
novel The Great Gatsby by American author Scott Fitzgerald: 
“Whenever you feel like criticizing anyone just remember 
that all the people in this world haven’t had the advantages 
you’ve had.” To go or not go, to remember or not to remember? 
Sometimes, we tend to solve an unfortunate incident or accident 
by the solution of oblivion, rather than by that of memory. At 
the time of the incident, people were interested in it, but as time 
goes by they forget it easily for a fresh start. In other words, we 
try to blank out those memories that we are not quite so fond of 
according to our convenience, but we cannot completely bury 
them from our memory. Thus, the memory is a proper solution 
not to do such a thing again. It’s the only way to recover a broken 
mutual trust and conﬁ dence, and to resuscitate the meaning of 
human communities destroyed by the extrinsic trauma like the 
war. To talk of the trauma of the past is to pave the road for a 
future peace and to transplant a tree of peace.
Epilogue: Chineseness, Japaneseness, and Korean 
Us-ness
Tourism is a cultural phenomenon that mirrors the structure and 
contradictions of modernity. If this modernity is a colonial one, 
its structural contradictions - such as the rich-poor gap, tradition-
modernity conﬂ ict, imperialist repression, human alienation, 
racial discrimination, and othering - become more intensiﬁ ed 
and even more aggravated in the process of modernization, as 
we conﬁ rmed from the East-Asian tourist gazes, Chinese travel 
notes, Korean colonial novels and Japanese anti-war movies. 
Global tourism is often cited as the “new colonizing vanguard 
of modernity,” characterized by the search for mythical places, 
colorful natives, and authentic cultural experiences (Lofgren, 
1999; Macannel, 1999). Tourism is viewed as being instrumental 
in the neo-colonization of Third World countries, but it is also 
seen as an indication of democracy in societies of the western 
developed world.
The tourist is conceived as the emblematic ﬁ gure of modernity 
(Oakes, 1998), so being a tourist is to culturally experience 
modernity or late-modernity. In relation to late-modernity where 
South Koreans, once the object of colonial gazing, are now 
among the groups of middle class Asian travelers, let’s consider 
brieﬂ y Chineseness, Japaneseness, and Korean-us ness, by way 
of conclusion.
The word Chineseness or Sino-centrism (Zhongguo ideas) 
reminds me of a newspaper story on Nike’s ads showing NBA 
star LeBron James battling a cartoon kungfu master and dragons. 
The ads have invoked great controversy in China. China banned 
the ads, describing them as an insult to the country’s national 
dignity. It was the mistake of Nike’s advertising agency for 
thinking in this simpliﬁ ed way: If LeBron defeats the dragons 
and the kungfu master that Chinese people consider great, 
they will consider him even greater. Nowadays, the term of 
Chineseness or Sino-centrism has come into general use. The 
PRC is the world’s most-populous country. Thus, it seems to 
be very difﬁ cult for the PRC to integrate 55 ethnic minority 
groups into the Han majority and to uniformly govern them 
without such an integral ideology. But, this terminology became 
popular and popularized only with Qichao Liang (1873-1929) 
who began to use it to back his nationalist cause as chief editor 
under the crisis of historical consciousness: “Our splendid and 
glorious Zhongguo ideas were (…) Yellow people are not greatly 
different from white ones; therefore, the former can also do what 
the latter can do. The Japanese are the great imitator of Western 
culture, but their races are derived from China.”
Before Liang coined the term Zhongguo nation, the Chinese 
had no notion of a modern nation-state in a contemporary sense. 
Thus, the so-called Zhongguo ideas have just a 100-year history. 
In the pre-modern period, there was no dynasty or nation under 
the name of China. China was a “common noun” that was just 
a generic term for 30 dynasties: From the ﬁ rst uniﬁ ed dynasty 
Qin (221-206 BC) to the last dynasty Qing (1644-1911). In the 
modern period, the term China was transformed into a “proper 
noun” which indicates a speciﬁ c country. The actual territory of 
the PRC was given by the Qing dynasty, founded by the Manchu 
people. The Chinese dilemma of incorporating non-Han 
Chinese - Yuan and Qing - dynasties into one Chinese national 
history is the main cause of the so-called “Chinese northeast 
project (Yoon, 2004).” The thesis that “China is composed of 
Chinese history based on Zhongguo ideas” is a matrix fabricated 
by Chinese modern historians and reformers.
China has always employed the name “China” in place of 
“Asia,” viz. Western powers, since it ﬁ rst came into contact 
with the Occident. China considers itself to be a “mono-unit” 
of civilization, equal to (if not superior to) Western civilization. 
Almost in the same period, Japan got in direct contact with 
Western powers as the representative of Asia. Furthermore, 
Japan wanted to be “another Europe” by separating itself from 
Asia (Lee, 2003).
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Modernity is postulated in Western modernity as “universal,” 
and this leads to the unilinear historical consciousness seeking 
temporal and spatial homogeneity. Westerners consider the pre-
modernity of the non-Western world according to European 
criteria, but the problem is that the Japanese themselves 
voluntarily deﬁ ned the modernity according to European/
Western standards. Therefore, Japan’s mistake is to equate 
modernization with Westernization. Japanese modern history is 
just a blind imitation on the Western model. Since the open-door 
policy, the Japanese have regarded the UK as the most civilized 
nation and the symbol of modernity. They gazed in awe at the 
UK as the richest nation, the most stabilized constitutional 
monarchy and the largest Empire in the world, even saying 
“Japan antagonizing the UK would be like making an enemy 
of the world!” They considered themselves as the “second UK” 
or “the UK in East Asia.” For example, the Things Western 
of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) - after his embassy travels 
into West - was the best medium to disseminate effectively 
to Japanese people a dream of establishing a nation-state as a 
product of Western modernity. In 1871 the Iwakura mission (a 
Japanese diplomatic journey) served as momentum to realize 
British greatness and Japanese inferiority in the tourist gaze of 
Japanese delegation. When the Japanese ardor for the West was 
at its peak, Arinori (1847-1889) and Ito Hirobumi formed two 
extremely bizarre ideas of replacing the Japanese language with 
English and of persuading the Tenno to convert to Christianity. 
In those days, the gap between the old and new generations or 
that between the westernized and the non-westernized Japanese 
was so great that it could be said that the “new Japanese in frock 
coats looked at the old Japanese in kimonos in a more unfamiliar 
way than Westerners,” according to an English literature 
professor Basil Chamberlain residing in Japan.
Japan did not recognize that Western modernization and 
Japanese Westernization could not be identical, but after the 
Triple intervention Japan became skeptical about Western 
modernity by recognizing the European conception of Japan as 
a “permanent other.” The Western powers never assumed that 
Japan could reach modernity in such a short period of time and 
become one of them in competing for supremacy.
After realizing the limits of Western modernization, the Japanese 
pursued Japanese-style modernization. There were great debates 
between the modernists and the nationalists in the 1890s where 
the wave of ultra-nationalism captivated the Japanese youth. In 
this process of self-puriﬁ cation, the Japanese national identity 
was formed. Thus, the so-called “Japaneseness” was also 
invented in the process of modernizing Japan after the Meiji 
restoration. In other words, it is a classic representation of “the 
invention of tradition (Itakura, 2004).” In the 1910s, the Japanese 
had a clash of interest with the British in China. The Japanese 
sentiment toward the UK was rapidly aggravated. The British, 
being aware of Japanese expansionist ambition, also turned 
back to anti-Japanism. Japan attempted to destroy the hierarchy 
established by the Western powers, but the terminus of this 
abortive saga was the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, also known as the Tokyo Trials. After the defeat of WWII, 
Japan continues to separate itself from Asia, clinging once again 
to American modernization. Promoting regional cooperation in 
East Asia won’t be possible, unless Japan has more conﬁ dence 
in its own self-identity breaking from echoes of its past self-
schizophrenia symptom: Japan is in Asia, but it denies Asianness. 
Post-war Japan has also utilized its relationship with Asia as a 
means of Japanese economic development (Hirakawa, 2009).
On the other hand, the UK by underestimating Japan suffered 
from the disgrace of Hong Kong and Malaya being occupied by 
the Japanese military, which in turn led to the dissolution of the 
British Empire after the end of the WWII. In retrospect, the UK 
and Japan were both the victims of modernity that made a sharp 
distinction between self and others (Park, 2003).
As for Koreanness or Korean us-ness, one of the characteristics 
of Korean society and Korean way of thinking is uniformity. 
A uniform, homogeneous society is not very tolerant toward 
disruptive individual behaviors. In fact, the Korean word “tul-
li-da” that is equivalent to “different” in English also means 
“wrong.” What are the reasons for that? One of them is mainly 
due to mutual-interventionism. In contrast to American/European 
individualism and mutual non-interventionism, Koreans usually 
like to poke into other people’s affairs. Korean mutualism as a 
social value is that “we” is more emphasized than “I.” Koreans 
even refer to their own spouses as our wife and our husband. 
Aside from mutual interventionism, Koreans also have a strong 
sense of nationalism. During the 2002 World Cup, millions of 
Koreans wearing red T-shirts came out of their homes to join 
collective cheering on the street for the national soccer team. As 
an example of Korean inclination to conform to a single standard, 
there is an affectionate term: “The Korean nation’s little sister” 
to indicate a rising star loved by Koreans. This means that it is 
so famous that it can be regarded as the younger sister of the 
whole nation. In a nation of 50 million people, it is not difﬁ cult 
to see why some movies attract 10 million viewers. Why are 
collectivism, groupism, communitarian values so important on 
the Korean peninsula? United we stand, divided we fall?
Koreans were swept away, half-willingly and half-not, by the 
strong currents of “hybrid” modernity where the pre-modernity 
and modernity intricately coexist. This hybrid modernity 
almost keeps pre-modern cultural elements like nepotism, 
family-oriented particularism, intolerance for diversity, 
authoritarianism, totalitarian-mobilization culture, negligence 
for human rights, statism, etc. intact. Korean people are proud of 
being the “one-blooded nation,” but the matrix of a one-blooded 
nation is ﬁ rst derived from the experience of colonial modernity 
in the 20th century, second from the future aspiration for a one 
nation-state by overcoming the grief-stricken reality of the 
national division of South and North Korea. During the Japanese 
colonial period, the nation was an alternative and compensated 
the absence of Korean state on earth. The state did not exist in 
reality and was therefore replaced by the national spirit. Korean 
history has played a pivotal role in the political and religious 
bible of nationalism. If the state is a body, the history is a 
spirit. Chae-ho Shin (1880-1936), the founder of the nationalist 
historiography of Korea, called the host ethnic group “Buyo” 
and elevated the status of the mythical ﬁ gure, Tangun as the 
progenitor of the Korean nation. His nationalist view of history 
served as the starting point for a single-race nationalism. Since 
Korea gained independence, this single-race nationalism or 
mono-nationalism has functioned as an ideology for building up 
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state legitimacy and social integration in both South and North 
Korea. The paradigm of Korean national history has formed an 
episteme of historical knowledge recording only the necessary 
past periods which remind Korean-us of our single-nationhood, 
while obliterating unnecessary ones in a storehouse of memory.
However, is the problem that nationalism also has positive effects 
even in the 21st century? Some Koreans believe that nationalism 
is still valid for the reuniﬁ cation of Korea, but nowadays 
South Korean society has reached the multi-cultural era with one 
million foreigners, which might still seem tiny to Europeans or 
Americans. The myth of the so-called one blooded nation is the 
main obstacle to socially integrating these foreign immigrants. 
Korea has the dual task of the nation’s reuniﬁ cation, and of the 
integration of multi-cultural Koreans. This leads to hot debates 
and conﬂ icts between nationalism and post-nationalism. Now, 
South Korean society is faced with the turning point of creating 
a new code to decide exclusivism, inclusivism or pluralism, viz. 
overseas Koreans and a growing inﬂ ux of foreigners in the late-
modern period. In fact, Korea has the lowest birthrate and the 
fastest aging population in the world. If so, who should really 
work for Korea? If Koreans do not have a multicultural identity 
by getting out of the ghost of nationalism, there is no future 
for Korea. 2008 was the 60th birthday of the Republic of Korea 
established in 1848. Korea is a unique country which has been 
miraculously transformed from a recipient into an aid country 
since WWII. The nation’s great power of the 21st century is not 
derived from the military force to conquer a massive territory, 
but from the cultural power, that is soft power. Therefore, it 
is needed as an alternative to re-construct Korean history by 
cultural means, not by the state or nation. Because making us 
Koreans is Korean culture. The Korean identity should not 
be based on the principle of jus sanguinis like a nation but on 
cultural DNA. As David Berreby said in his book Us and Them: 
The Science of Identity (2008), “people may join a group and 
then begin to act like them (Kim, 2010).”
Today’s tourism is deeply rooted in the daily life of the 
contemporary man. It’s worth being called the “golden age of 
tourism.” There is no one who can avoid meeting the “tourist 
gaze.” It means the globalization of tourist gaze. However, in 
spite of its qualitative/quantitative expansion, international 
tourism has too many hindrances and hidden sides to achieve the 
ideal of tourism: Namely, human happiness for all. As mentioned 
above, the tourism formed under modernity is viewed as being 
instrumental in the neo-colonization of third world countries, 
but for the societies of the Western, developed world is also 
seen an indication of democracy. This fundamental difference 
is probably derived from the past colonial experiences in the 
third world. 70% of world tourist markets are dominated by the 
US and Europe. This inequality within the present structure of 
global tourism can be expected to be solved by the growth of 
Asia and Middle East tourist markets.
It is necessary to realize the democratization of tourism, to avoid 
the excessive commercialization of tourism culture, and the 
global and imperialistic dynamics in the standardized tourism 
industry. We expect to see a “power shift” in the international 
tourist market with which the three East Asian countries are 
also faced, move toward the China growing at a rapid pace 
in the tourism industry. In 2020, China is expected to be the 
world’s most popular tourist destination, surpassing France, the 
US, Spain, and Italy, etc. With the “rising of China,” East Asia 
regional orders formerly considered “periphery” comes to the 
fore.
What are the possibilities and limits of 21st century China? Can 
we expect the advent of regional hegemonism or the challenge 
of a new industrial nation as a world factory? Some scholars 
mention the “Pax Mongolica” system, similar to today’s 
American-led globalization, which is assumed to exist before the 
Sino-centric world: Pax-Mongolica ax-Mongolica lobalization, 
which is assumed to exist before the Sino-centric world: Pax-
Mongolica l nation as a world facto attractive programmer to 
establish a new civilization order in East Asia? In the change of 
East Asian regional order, the so-called “soft power of China” 
will be tested. The discussion on Chinese soft power is deﬁ nitely 
concerned with historical cultural heritages. The Chinese history 
and civilization themselves are the actual assets of Chinese soft 
power. Among them, especially the Confucianism attracts the 
public attention as a core element of Chinese civilization capable 
of proposing Chinese own values and visions, quite different 
from Western ones.
We can also enumerate as the cases of Chinese soft power 
potentialities, from the point of view of Western scholars, the 
Nobel Prize award of a Chinese dissident novelist Gao Xingian 
(2000), Chinese movie Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), 
basketball player Yao Ming, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, the 
huge inﬂ ux of foreign tourists and students into the mainland 
China, etc. However, many Chinese cultures still remain at 
the level of unreﬁ ned ores like “analog contents in high-tech 
digital period.” Is there a Hollywood in the Chinese version? Is 
there any movie with the story of Chinese heroes who save the 
earth from the attacks of other space raiders and aliens, aside 
from Chinese stereotyped martial arts movies? (Kim, 2008) 
But, the contents of Chinese culture seem to be at the level of 
historical consciousness of an underdeveloped country: That is, 
nationalism, if not chauvinism. The Chinese government tends 
to consider the politics of cultural soft power as a discourse of 
zero sum game. However, the attractiveness of the “Beijing 
consensus” depends on the durability of the parallelism between 
market economy and political authoritarianism: Democratization 
of the political system supporting the market economy in other 
words.
Since the propagation of a modern international order which 
blocked any attempt of non-ofﬁ cial nation-states to take part 
in it, the East Asian region has been transformed by external/
exogenic orders. Former peripheral nations such as Korea, 
Japan and Vietnam escaping from the Chinese tributary/
investiture system became nation-state equivalents to China. 
They established their own national identity by making Chinese 
empire - in the form of a nation-state - “other” or “othernization.” 
Nevertheless, the switch to the system of the nation-state has 
not yet been completed in East Asia. Korea is a divided nation, 
Hong Kong, Okinawa, and Taiwan are evidently not nation-
states. Japan under the peace constitution is not a “normal” state. 
China still keeps an “imperial reality” hardly to be considered as 
one nation-state.
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In the late 20th century, the American global standard penetrated 
into a “vacancy” of traditional Sino-centric order. However, 
Western modern international order was not completely 
established in East Asia where tradition and modernity still 
coexist. Recently, due to the globalization, informatization, 
democratization, even post-modernity phenomena appear in 
East Asia. As the networks of non-state actors and authorities 
like multinational enterprises and international networks of 
civil society organizations emerged with horizontal networks 
among the states, the triple structure “tradition-modernity-
late modernity” concurrently works in the East Asia in the 
21st century.
East Asia is one region in the world where there is as yet no 
formal machinery for regional integration. However, China and 
Japan are at present in dispute over Diaoyu/Sengaku islands 
in the East China Sea and Japan and Korea are in dispute over 
Takeshima/Tok-Do islands in the Sea of Japan/the East Sea. 
Compounding these disputes is the long history of political 
rivalry or, worse, political enmity between China and Japan and 
between Japan and Korea. Japan and China have mistrusted each 
other for decades since Japan’s occupation of China and Beijing 
is wary of Japan’s closer cooperation with the US who is on 
strict guard against “Chinese hegemonism or China’s challenge 
to Pax America.”
To overcome Western Orientalism (Western conceptions of the 
Orient) and to build a new East Asian identity, three countries 
(China, Korea, and Japan) should practice an experimentation 
of socio-cultural exchanges, but who will bell the neck of a wild 
cat called a new East Asian community?
The term “soft power” was coined and used by Joseph Nye, 
in international relations, in 1989. Hard power is the ability 
to pull compulsorily what you want near to contrary to what 
the other party wants. Soft power is an ability to induce others 
to want what you want. When the Satsuma domain invaded 
the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa) where there were no armed 
forces, 3000 Japanese soldiers were mobilized. At the moment 
of Okinawan annexation by Japan in 1879, 160 policemen 
and 400 infantrymen had just been dispatched into Okinawa. 
Okinawan islanders who had enjoyed the DMZ (?) for a long 
time considered Japanese soldiers as the “beasts of Yamato!” 
Originally, does the Chinese character 强 which means 
“strong power” have the bug (虫) in it? As we saw in the brief 
analysis of Chineseness, Japaneseness, and Koreaness, the 
national identities of the three countries are commonly the 
modern invention of tradition in the cloak of nationalism. If 
any country seeks to appeal with the hard power based on the 
discourse of a rich nation and a strong army of the nation-
state, it will be soon branded as an “imperialist.” The term of 
Beijing consensus has evolved, as the Chinese development 
program seeks to appeal not only to East Asia but also to the 
developing countries of the Third World. On the other hand, 
Japan using its theory of the East Asian community, seems to 
try to get an initiative of cooperation and integration within 
the limit of the region. This can be called “Tokyo consensus.” 
If Korea tried to lead East Asia to unite, then it would be 
“Seoul consensus” (Sohn, 2008).
The utopia of tourism for all will be possible with the goodwill 
policies that aim to solve the structural problems in late-modern 
East Asia and the “epistemological break” with the colonial 
modernity, nationalism and imperialism internalized in the 
modern tourism world. In this respect, tourism can play an 
important role in creating “East Asian regional public goods” 
by decreasing trade conﬂ icts or creating new jobs and additional 
or extra-economic value through a common cultural industry 
among the three countries. As for the possibility of “Korean 
soft cultural leadership” among these countries, we can maybe 
indicate the popularity of Korean culture, often called “the 
hot wind of Han Ryu” in China and the other Asian countries. 
This new cultural phenomenon proves that Korean culture, 
which historically acted as a bridge between China and Japan, 
has common cultural DNA or cultural denominators, and that 
Korean culture is capable of creating such common cultural 
archetypes, which appeal to Asian people, especially Chinese 
and Japanese people.
In the post-national period, a liberal Korean researcher said 
that the effort of making a nation-state, in crying “hurrah for 
national independence,” might be our bone-deep internalization 
of westernization. Nevertheless, as we observed the agony and 
deprivation in the tourist gaze of a Korean traveler in Hong Kong, 
or in the dark narration of Dong-nae hot spa resorts in colonial 
period, judging the pre-modern or modern things according to 
the logic of post-modernism seems anachronistic. According to 
a Korean correspondent who travelled into Okinawa to cover 
a story, Okinawans selected the former colonial ruler who 
abandoned them as their fatherland, even though they received 
the right to choose independence in 1972 through the post-
war American military government. It would be tantamount to 
selecting to become a colony again instead of being emancipated 
under the colonial rule for whatever reason. Japan sticking to war 
watched one ﬁ fth of Okinawan residents dying in WWII. During 
the coverage of the Okinawan case, the Korean correspondent 
expressed his perplexity at the insipid answer of an Okinawan 
anti-war activist, “we really need someone to lean on because 
we’ve been so persecuted under the US army’s military 
government” Okinawa became a “part” of an advanced country 
in return for renouncing their independence. Even though 
Okinawa is Japan’s poorest prefecture, their per capita income 
reaches more than 70% of the Japanese mainland averages. The 
peripheral position of Okinawans in the Japanese society is seen 
as “melancholy,” to the point where one would ask oneself what 
does the advanced country mean to Okinawans? However, poor 
one may be, self-reliance and self-esteem are very important to 
both individual citizen and nation.
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